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1  . GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC 
STRATEGY 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
" 
This  communication  is  a  follow-up  to  the  debate· - relaunched  by  the  European 
Council meeting at  Portschach - on infrastructure  investment in  the_ context of the 
broad  discussion  on  economic  growth,  competitiveness  and .  employment  in  the 
European Union.  · 
This discussion underlines the fact that govern~ent investment in infrastructure has a · 
strong impact on the economy, but is usually one of  the first categories of  government 
expenditure  to  suffer  cut-backs  in  case  of budgetary  constraints  or  unfavourable 
developments in business cycles. 
The Commission considers that the budgetary adjustment pursued by  Member States 
in  the run-up to  the -third 'stage of EMU  put  the  public  finances  onto a sustainable 
path, which led to  improved economic conditions-encouraging the investment needed 
for  further  growth.  However,  government  expenditure  restraint  has  had  a 
disproportionate  impact on government investment,  which  fell  from  around  3% of 
GDP at the beginning of  the 1990's to 2.1% in  1998. Budgetary discipline in line with 
the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact must b.e 
maintained,  but  there  is a need  for  a restructuring  of government  expenditure  in 
favour  of government  investment.  This  document  deals  with  promoting  public 
investment  spending  compatible  with  budgetary  discipline,  and  public  private 
partnership.  -
II.  ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR .GROWTH  AND INVESTMENT 
The economic policies pursued in preparing for the third stage of EMU improved the 
conditions  for  sustainable  growth  of output and  .employment. During  the  last  few 
years, the fundamental  conditions for  investment also  improved as a result of these 
policies: inflation has been stabilised at a low level,  in~erest rates both long and short-
term have come down, profitability' has increased, and  the  financing of government 
current spending no  longer crowds out the financing of investment in the  domestic 
capital market. 
After considerable weakness at the beginning of the  1990s, private investment,. which 
is  eight times larger than government  investment,  is  now  on  a  recovery  path.  The 
Commission services' Autumn 1998  Forecasts project that private investment in  real 
terms  will  increase  by  4  to  5%  in  both  1998  and  1999.  However,  for  private 
investment to be fully effective in generating output growth and employment, it must 
be accompanied by an appropriate development of  infrastructure. _ 
Even  though  government  investment  is_  showing  a  systematic  downward  trend  in 
practically all  mature· industrialised economies,  it  has  been  reduced  significantly in 
EU countries over the last few years.  In  the European Union as a whole, it fell  from 
around  3% of GOP  at  the  beginning of this  decade  to  2.1%  in  1998.  In  Belgium, -
Denmark,  Germany~ Sweden and ·the  United  Kingdom, government invcstrrient  is  at 
present below 2% of GDP,  while  it  is  above 3% only  in  Greece,  Luxembourg and 
Portugal. In most other Member States, it lies around 2.5% of  GOP (sec table). 
2 ..  '· 
Table  - --
-
Government investment expenditure 
(Ge-neral government gross fixed capital formation, 
as %of  GOP) 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  .1997  1998 
8  1.4  \A  1.3  L5  -1.6  1.4  1.2  1.4- 1.5* . 
DK  2.0•  1.9  23*  2.2  2.0  1.9  2.1*  2.0*  1.8* 
D  2.2*  2.5  2.8*  :2.5  2.4*  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.8-
EL  2.8  -3.2  3.5  3.1  3.0  3.2  3.1'  3.4  3.8* 
E  5.0•  4;<)  4.0  4.0  3.9  3.7  3.0  2.9*  2:9• 
...  3 ..  1*  '1.4.•  H  1.:1  :1.2  1.1  2.!1  2.!1  2.7 
IH.L  2.1  2.2  2.0  2.2  - 2.:1*  2.4*  2A*  '2.:1*  ;u• 
i  3.3  '3.3  1.0  2.6  2.1  2.2  2.1  ::u'  2.5 
L  5.4*  - 4.9*  5.5*'  5.4*.  4.4*  4.7*  4.8*  4.7*  -5.4* 
NL  2.7  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.6*  2.7*  - 2.6* 
A  3.2•  -3.3*  3.3*  3.2  3.2  3.0  -_  -2.8  2.0*  2.0 
p 
.I  3.4  3.5  3.9*,  4.0  - 3.6  3.7  4.1*  4.2*  4.2*' 
FIN  3.6*  - 3.7*  3.5  2.8  2.8  2.6  2.7  2.8*  2.5* 
s  3.0•  3.0*  2.9  l.l  3.1  2.9  2.1  2.5*  1.4* 
UK  2.3*  2.1  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.3  1.1  1.2*a) 
EURll  3.0  3.0  2.9  '3.0  2.8  2.7  2.5  2.4  2.3* 
EUR1_5  2.9  3.0  3.0  2.8  2-7  2:6  2.4  2.2  2.1* 
•  Denotes that-government investment expenditure is greater than or equal to the government deficit, U:. the 
golde'n rule is met. 
·a)  'Financial year 
Source: Commission se.rvices. 
/' 
- -
.. 
- -- --
:  ..  .  . 
This reduction is  partially .due to the  fact  that, du'ring the rccentpcriod oi· budgetary 
adjustment, a disproportionate share of spending cuts fell  on government investment 
expenditure. Iri addition, a part of infrastructure investment is' being shifted into the 
private sector.  . 
Indeed, ·much infrastructure  investment - for  example,  on telecommunications  ~nd 
other utilities ahd to. a lesser extent transport ~ is  now carried out by private sector 
enterprises  or  by  free-standing- publicly-owned ·enterprises-.  Recently,- part  of· the·-
infrastructure investment which traditionally was_ implemented by government - both. 
at the central and local-level- is being provided by the private sector in co-operation 
with the government For example, around one quarter of  the reduction in government 
investment in the Uni.ted Kingdom over the period  1993~  1997 can be explained by the 
shifting into the private_ sector -via the  so-called  "Private Finance Initiative''- of 
_ spending that was previously classified as government investment. 
However, the government retains a m~jor n)Ic in setting the rcgulattn·y framework and 
in  the direct provision of certain  kinds of inlrastructure,  for example n)ads,  schorils 
· and  hospitals.  It should  also  be  noted  that  soi11e  clcltlcnts  of current  g<lverrimcnl 
expenditu.r<;,  such  as  spending  on  research,  educati(m  tlr  on  l~tbour  training 
3 programmes, can be considered as investment in human c~pital and can thus also have 
beneficial supply-side effects. 
This analysis shows that, even allowing  for  the  shift of investment activity  i'nto  the 
private sector, government investment has horne a disproportionate sh<irc of spending 
cuts in recent years.  While government expenditure as a whole has dedined as share 
of GDP, government investment has fallen relatively more sharply from  close to 3% 
to  only just  over  2%  of GDP  since  the  early  1990's,  though  this.  masks  very 
considerable differences between national performances. 
Increased public investment is therefore necessary for the competitive performance of 
the European economy.  The question  is  therefore  how to  give  public investment 
sufficient prominence while maintaining budgetary discipline. 
Ill.  BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
Budgetary discipline must not be put into jeopardy hy the current drive to  increase the 
priority given to government investment hecause it will ensure low interest rates and a 
better' allocation  of  savings. which  both  contribute  to  enhance  investment  and 
employm~nt.  Given  the  low  level  of government  investment  spending  there  is 
however a case for action in  favour of government investment in  compatibility with 
the Stability and Growth Pact. · 
It is important to underline that the case for greater government investment is not as a 
form of counter-cyclical budgetary policy.  Spending on investment' projects cannot 
be  used  as  a  stabilisation  tool  in  view  of  inflexibilities  in  the  timing  and 
implementation of such types of spending.  The underlying logic of the golden rule, 
under which borrowing ·should not exceed the level of government investment, is that 
current generations should not build up debts for future generations by failing .to pay 
for current spending, but that investment for the benefit of succeeding generations can 
be financed from borrowing. It is encouraging to note from the table  ~hat in  1998 for 
the first time the EU in the aggregate (both EUR 11  and EUR 1.5) respects the golden 
rule and that 11  Member States do so individually. Four Member States while meeting 
. the 3% ceiling, do not respect the golden rule in  1998, their deficit being greater than 
government investment thus causing government dissaving.  · 
The Treaty states that the Commission shall take into account;whether the government 
deficit· exceeds  government  investment  expenditure  when  assessing  the  budgetary 
position of a Member State. Member States report data which have to be of reliable 
quality on government investment in line with the provisions of the excessive deficit 
procedure,' following  the  definition  laid  down  in  secondary  legislation.  These  data 
have always been taken into account by  the Commission in  its reports under Article 
104c(3) when initiating the excessive deficit procedure. 
In line with this approach, the Commission will ensure it makes an assessment of the 
adequacy of public investment, and the implications of the programme with regard to 
the  objectives  of the  Stability  and Growth  Pact,  in  its  recommendations  for  the 
Convergence and Stability programmes, and  will  invite the Council to take a similar 
approach.  [fa "golden rule" - which allows governments to  run  deficits in  order to 
finance government investment- were to be applied in the current situation as the sole 
criterion of budgetary  dis~ipline, Member States  might feel  encouraged to  halt the 
ongoing  reduction  in  their  underlying  structural  deficit  m  conflict  with  the 
4 . requireme~ts of  the Stability and Growth Pal:t. Allowing gowrnn~cnt_  invcs.tmcnt to  h~ 
fully  deficit~financed even  above the  deticit  ceilirig  implied  by  these  requirements 
would  take  off  the · pressure  from  the  necessary  restructuring  of  government 
expenditure. 
A  -satisfactory  hnplemen~ation of  the  "golden  'rule"  raises  a  number  of  ,oth~r 
difficulties as well. The problems related to the splitting of the budget into a current 
and  a  capital  section  may  create  incentives  for  governments  to  classify,  current 
expenditure as capital spending. As a result, budgetary positions would become even 
more  ·difficul~ to monitor under the "golden rule" than .is currently the case. Moreover, 
wren investment projects  do,  not generate  sufficient 'returns  to  pay  back  the debts 
· incurred to finance these projects; excessive borrowing may arise. In sum,  r~spect of 
the "golden rule" does not· guarantee that the public finances are sustainable anq that 
the government debt ratio is controlled. Clearly; the golden rule must not be ·used as  · 
an excuse for breaching budgetary discipline.· But equally, the  Stability and Growth 
Pact should not be applied in a way that discourages investment that Is consistent with 
sustainability. The room to  finance the necessary increase in government inve.stment 
spending will have to be found through a structural correction of current goveinrnent . 
expenditure.  This  commitment to  budgetary  dis!;ipline ·will ensure  that the  current 
favourable conditions enhancing investment will be maintained. 
This  general  approach  is  in  line · with  the  positions  taken  by  the. Community 
institutions  so  far.  The  Council  on  several  occasions  endorsed 'the  Commission's 
· advice. to  the· Member  State~· to  bring their budgets towards a position of  ~'close to 
.balance  or in  surplus"  by- the  year  2002  at· the  latest  and· to  increase· investment . 
spending on infrastructure as well as em other productive activities, such as on human 
capital and active iabour market initiatives, without threatening the necessary further 
reduction in the· deficit.  · 
As well as making room within government budgets for additional direct spendi~g on 
irtfrastnicture  investment  so  as  to  reverse  the  decline  of recent .years,  there  is 
considerable scope for expanding the provision of infra$tructure investment through 
greater use of  public-private partnerships. The nature of these arrangements and some 
initiatives which could b~  taken-at Cm:nmunity level to encourage their more effective 
use·are explored in the following sectio:ns of  this note  .. 
However, it must be recognised that most schemes of this kind are likely to involve 
some costs to  gov'ernmen~ budgets, in·the form of capital or operating transfers, etc., 
in order to generate a  suffici~nt· financial  return t~ secure private sector involvement. 
Moreover,  there  dm  be  some "dangers  in  shilling  activity  of this  kind.  off the 
· govcrnm~nt balance sheet; if there is ilo genuine' ri~k-sharing hctween  tl~e private and 
· gqvcrnment sector and  the  lii1ancing  {)I'  projcds is  wholly  covered  by  government 
guarantees, then the contingent liabilities assumed by  government can result in  large 
·unpredictable costs to  government budgets in. future  years.  However, well designed 
PPPs  Cal}  both  reduce  the  need  for  government  grant  finance  and  result  m  an 
appropriate transfer of risk to the private sector.  . 
IV.  NEW FORMS OF INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING 
/ 
IIi  recent years  M~mber  Stat~s have  shown an  incre_ased  int~rest in  public-private 
partnership structures to finance major infrastructure. Such partnerships are generally 
5 based on the principle that infrastructure services are no  longer only provided directly· 
by governments using govermnent-owned assets. hut. arl~ now hein!,!.  supplied also hy 
the  enterprise  Sector  against  SOilll'  lill'lll  ol"  I'L"\'l'llll\.'
1
.  110\Vl'\'l'l',  public  pri\'llll' 
partnerships arc not only ·a source of  ~omplemcntary linam:ing, hilt also ai1  instrument . 
for introducing private sector efficiencies into infrastructure projecls 'throughout their 
planning and operational stage. .  · 
In the  construction and operation of large  infrastructure  projects, the private sector 
can only  perform  its  role  if there  is  ·some  form. of government  involvement.  The 
government creates the  framewo~k andthe incentive system  th~t determines whether 
or not private sector participation in the provisiol) of infrastructure is feasible. Private 
sector  involvement  is  directly  related  to  the  prospect  of. an  acceptable  level  of 
profitability  and . a  suitable  revenue  stream,  subject  to  an  acceptable  level  of 
uncertainty. It is the government that has the power to  take measures to  reduce the 
technical  and  financial  uncertainty of projects  to  a  level  acceptable  to  the  private 
promoter, be the project in question a new project based on direct user charges or 
relying on shadow tolls, or even a transfer to the private sector of  a mature project or  • 
portfolio of projects.  Member States  have  adopted  this  approach  in  vanous  ways, 
illustrated by the following examples:  · 
The Finnish Main Road 4 - sha4ow tolls. This stretch of a Finnish motorway is to be 
constructed and  maintained by  a  private company owned by  Swedish and  Finnish 
companies. The private concession company is responsible for the planning and the 
construction of the  motorway and  for  its  maintenance  over. 15  years,. and  shall  be 
compensated by shadow tolls  for  the construction and  maintenance on  the basi's  of 
traffic flow after the motorway has been opened for traffic. 
-
The  Second Tagus  bridge - example of a  transfer  of an. existing  upfront  revenue 
stream. This Lisbon bridge was funded and realised by a special purpose vehicle fully 
owned by private investors on the basis of a concession to operate the existing First 
Tagus Bridge together with the new bridge and raising tolls on both for 33 years. The 
first  bridge therefore  helped  to  fund  the  second  one.  Additional  finance  has  been 
provided by tJ'te EIB on the strength of a completion guarantee, commercial banks and 
the Cohesion fund. 
.  '  . 
The  Oresund fixed link bridge - direct user charges in the form  of tolls. This bridge . 
project .linking  Copenhagen  with  Malmo  is  built  on  the  basis  of an  unlimited 
concession for a consortium_ of the Danish and Swedish governments, .established in 
the form of a special purpose company, and  based on direct user charges, i.e.  tolls 
rais.ed  from  motorway  operations  ~nd fixed  annual  payments  from  the  railway 
companies. The special purpose company financed the bridge by  raising loans 'under 
government guarantees.  -
The  PBKAL High Speed Line Nelherland,· --user charges and commercial exploitation 
of real  estate.  This  high-speed ·rail  connection,  linking  Amsterdam,  its  Schiphol 
airport and Rotterdam to the Belgian border is to be built largely by the government. 
Ways to most effectively involve private capital in the project have been investigated, 
and the project is  intended to  be  privatised as  a special  purpose  project company. 
Revenues from operations on the basis of  user charges and commercial exploitation of 
real estate asse_ts including stations will provide the revenue stream for this company. 
1  See COM(97) 453 final of I  0 September 1997. However,  the  capacity  to  generate  revenue  difters  significantly  between  different · 
kinds ofinfrastructure projects. Telecomniunicati.ons, energy and  water projects are 
usually either strongly cash-generative from the beginning of t)pcrations or _enjoy  an 
. accurately  predictable  cash-flow ..  ConvGrsely,- transport  projects  'may. encounter 
- significant obstacles in  raising. finance,  usually  beca-use  th~ir  capa~ity to, generate 
future  cash-flow  may  be  frcmght  ~ith  uncertainty.  Irrespective  of the  ~way  the 
government chooses to create a revenue  ~tream for the project; transport projects in 
particular  will  continue  to  require  public  funds  in  the ·form  of grants  or,  in  a 
recover~ble  form  as. risk-capital.  Therefore,  public-private  partnerships  are  not 
appropriate  for  all  types of infrastnicture  and  cannot  always  replace  grants,  in 
particular for transport infrastructure. 
As has been illustrated above, there are many alternative ways-for the cooperation of 
goverriments wtth the enterprise sector. The choice of the apprppriate mechanism for 
transfer of  investment-risk may be purely financial, but would usually be expected to 
reflect Jhe national Circumstances-including the  acceptability of user charges.  The. 
choices would also reflect the type of  investment made, with for instance :water works 
and road projects likely to be perceived difTc'rently by the general public.  . 
V.  ·  ~~CHOICE.  . OF,:-. MEANS .  FOR  PROMOTING  ·INVESTMENT  IN 
'INFRASTRUCTURE 
Public-private  partnerships  thus  have  an :important  role  to  play  in  accelerating 
implementation  of  essential  infrastructure.  The Commission  encourages  the • 
undertaking  of'·infrastructure  investment  through  public-private  partnerships.  But · 
there are two_  areas where "financing gaps"  can be  identiti~d. First, in many cases',  . 
implementing a  project-through a  public-private partnership can reduce  but by no 
inearis eliminate the need of  public grant finance, and the size and duration of  some of 
the  larger infrastructure projects  involve risks which the  private sector is  not in  a 
position to take·  on fully.  There are four areas where  action -by  the Community or. -
Community institutions combined with  Member State action  Would  lead to  a. more 
integrated  -approach ·to  dealing  with  the  financing  problems  of  public.  private ~ 
partnerships:  - ·  ·  -
Ad~qu_ate provision of grant  or similar  fin~nce,: to  bring  a  project to  fi~ancial 
, viability.'  A  major  step  in  this  respect  would  be  to  end_orse  the  Commission 
- >  proposal in Agenda 2000 for 5.5 Becu for trans-European networks in the period.· 
2000 to 2006.  .  · 
Use of the Community  budg~t to encourage the development of  instruments for 
_  ch~nelling_pr_ivate sector risk capital into infrastructure projects. 
Development of European Investment Bank lending instruments to better :(it  the 
· feat1.ues of long-term infrastructUre projects allowing. the .Bank to take more risk 
in  'line  with.  its- support· tor  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  under  the 
Ams_t!!rdain Special Action Programme of 1997 . 
.. 
- Explm:ation of the possibility for the ElF to provide _risk  capital for TEN's, and to 
extend  its  activities  to  accession' countries,· together ·with  a  clarification  cir . 
ex~ension of its eligibility rules, so  that it  can  make the ri1pst  ctTectivc  possible . 
contributionto infrastructure dev~lopment.- · · 
. '  7 Given  the  capacity  or the  European  capital  markets ..  there  is  llO  shortage  or loan 
linuncc  ut  Fmnpl'llll  kvd  li.!r  infi·ash'lll'lllrl' prnkl'ls.  Thl'  issul' · i.<:  mllll'r  111on·  111 
ensure thut the lending is availahlc ou suitahk tcn11s, and  thai, whnc apprup1 iale, it  i:; 
. accompanied  by  grant-type  linunce  to  complete  the  finant:ial  puckagc.  In  orc.lcr  to. 
expand the sc_ope that exists for using existing sources of finance in a complementary 
manner, greater synergy between the Member States, the European Investment Bank, 
the European lrive.stment F-und and Structural Fund instruments  thcrcf~)rc needs to  he 
developed.  · 1  ·  · 
Usi'!g grant finance effectively 
The  Commission  under  Agenda 2000  foresees ·a  substantial  increase  in  funds  for 
. infrastructure  (under  the  TENs  budget  lines,  the  ERDF  and  the  Cohesion  Fund). 
These funds  will  be  a  significant source of grants  and  other forms  of finance  for 
infrastructure investments in the European Union. Grant finance normally is provided 
in the early stages of  a project, since this· is when the major costs arise, with revenue 
accruing only at a later stage. There are numerous ways of avoiding paying the grant 
contribution upfrorit, thus easing the imm.ediate adverse budgetary impact. This could 
take the form of putting together financing packages which  include revenue streams 
from  existing projects  to  achieve  overall  financial  viability  (this  approach  has. for 
instance been used for the Tagus bridge in Portugal or the Second Severn bridge in 
· the U."K.), or of providing grant or similar finance at a later stage of the construction 
process. It is also desirable, where possible; _to  provide government contributions to 
projects in a  recoverable  fonp of risk capital,  which  would allow the  funds  ~o be 
recycled to new projectswhen they have helped previous ones on their way. 
Promoting public private partnerships also raises important-legal and administrative 
issues,  which were already  identified by  the  Commission in  its· communica,tion  on 
public private partnerships in transport TENs
2
• The involvement-of private finance in 
infrastructure projects can· usually best be  achieved through the creation of dedicated 
special  purpose  project  vehicles for  the  ownership,  construction  or  financing  of. 
infrastructure. The lack of rdcvant legislation inay_act as a barrier fi.)r  increased usc of 
public-private partnership-structures, notably fi.n the railway sector.  · 
Promoting risk capital 
The amounts of funds in the hands of pension funds and life assurance companies are 
·increasing  steeply  in  line  with  the  trend  towards  funded  pension  schemes  and 
increased demand for  pension.:.type  products  from  life  companies.  In  the  next few 
' . decades these assets will provide increasing liquidity to the· European capital  markets. 
At present these funds can only be harnessed for public infrastructUre investment by 
way of government bonds, i.e.  the government borrows from  pension funds and life 
companies and invests the moneys in  infrastructure. The creation ofmechanisms to 
allow institutional, investors  to  participate  directly  in  infrastructure  projects  would 
. reduce the necessity to  ~ycle these funds  through  govern~ent accounts and involve 
participation in the project risks._ 
The Commission, in  the  li.>llow-up  to  its ( ire~:n Paper on supplementary pensi(\ns  in 
the  single  market  is  exploring  wuys  or alleviating  the  hurc.lcn  or restrictions  on 
pcnsio~  funds  without  threatening  the  prudential  soundness  of the  fundsJ.  The . 
channelling of funds  into  infrastructure .projects  by  institutional  investors  could  be · 
COM(97)453 final of IO·September 1997. 
See COM(98) 625 final of28 October 1998: 
8 -facilitated  by--supporting- investment  funds  specialised  in  ii1frastrudurc.  SuciUi.mds 
are comparable to venture-capital funds: and the Commission,  in  the current review 
of the  TEN Financial  Regulation,  has  put tbrward  the  possibility  for  Community 
support  in the form  of risk-capital  participations  tor investment funds  focusing  on. 
trans-European  network  projects.  The  Commission  invites  the  Member  States to 
support this ptqposal.The small amount allocated by Council to  this  initiative at the · 
moment, however, is.only a_dequate for a limited pilot action:  · 
.  .  .  . 
·Lending mQre  s~ited  fo project needs 
The European· Investment-Bank is the principal source of loans at Union level, but it 
~  does not  norm~illy provide loans without commercial or Member State guarantees. It 
would be appropriaty for the Bank  ·to intensify. its efforts in  involving the enterprise 
sector In the financing  of infrastructure  .. To this  end,  it  should develop  acceptable 
forms  of risk-taking  for  infrastructur~, by.  itself becoming,  alongside. the  national 
governments, a risk-sharer in the implementation of infrastructure projects. Similarly  , 
to its SME support tinder the Amsterdam Special Action Programme, the Commission 
invites the Ballk to set up a special window for risk-sharing activities. Dr.awing on its  1.  · 
experience, · the  EIB  should  deveiop  the  instruments  which  would  allow  it  to  · 
. efficiently" complementfinancing available from  commerCial  sources;  it  could  for  . 
·example  consider  expanding  its  ·lending  to  i.nfrastructure  without  third  party 
guarantees,  the  development· of a·  better capability  to  provide  loans  during  the  , . 
·construction period of projects, ·the  tailoring of its loan products  to better ,suit the 
cash-flow  profile  of projects, ·or the· provision. of technical  assistance for special 
··projects.·  · 
The  Eurppean  Investment  Fund  has  an· important  compleme~tary roie  to: play  in 
facilitating the financing of projects of the enterprise sector by the provision of loan 
guarante.es. Since its creation in _199.4,  the Fund. has steadily built up  its underwriting 
skills an9 project-structuring expertise. At the end ·of September 1998 the  Ft~rtd had 
issued g~arantees in favour of  24 TEN projects to a value of Ecu 1.67 bn. Support for 
TENs should remain the top priority for the ElF; with an increasing contribution to be 
expected over the coming yearS. It could develop in the way suggested above ways to 
support m~re efficiently the general. development of infrastfUcture, e.g. by ·clarifying ·. 
or  extending  its  ~ligibility  rules.  At  the  sa,me  time,· the· Fund  should  explore  the 
possibility of extending  its operations to  future  accession countries  with  particular  . 
. reference to cross-border projects with EU Member States.  - '  · 
VI.  .  CONCLUSIONS 
· The budgetaryadjustil}ent pursued  by  Member States  in  recent years to_prepare for 
the third stage of  Efv!U has been essential to put the public finances onto a sustainable 
path  and  ha~ already  led  to a  much  improved climate  encouraging ·the  investment 
needed  for  faster  growth.  However,  government  expenditure· rcstminl ·has ·had  a· 
dlspr(}portiorialc impact on government investment, which has been. cut hack  relative 
to GOP in most Member States and fallen to very low levels in several or them.  . 
1  •  •  •  •  •  •  " 
Safeguarding of budgetary disCipline in line with the requirements of  the Treaty and . 
the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  must ·be  maintained,  but  there  is ·a ·case  for  a 
·restructuring  of go~emmerit  expenditure  m  favour  of  government  investment;  · 
especially in infrastructure.  ·  · 
'  .. 
9 ·In line with this approach, the Commission will ensure it makes an assessment of the 
adequacy of public investment, and the implications of the programme with regard to 
the  objectives  of the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  in  its  recommendations  for  the 
·Convergence and 'Stability programmes, and  wi II  invite the  Counci I to  take a simi Jar 
appro.ach.  · 
There is clear scope for further development of new methods to provide infrastructure 
through private sector involvement. The Commission therefore favours actions aiming 
at increasing the possibilities of  putting together viable financial packages for projects 
undertaken through public private partnerships by  private sector promoters and free-
standing public enterprises.  Thi~ means ensuring instruments to take on risk, but also 
adequ~te  gran~ finance. 
As far as grant finance is concerned, the Commission "invites the Council to join the 
European  Parliament  in  endorsing  the  financial  envolope  of 5.5  Becu  for  trans--
European networks put forward for the period 2000-2006 under Agenda 2000, and to 
. look at ways of  ensuring that this finance can be used most effectively.  · 
.  -
In order to encourage the development of private sector risk capital instruments, the 
Council is invited to agree to the Commission proposill on risk-capital under the TEN 
Fi~anciiil Reguiation.  ·  · 
As  far  as  instruments  to  take  on  risk  are  concerned,  ~he Commission  invites  the 
European Investment Bank to step up its efforts in  supporting the  implementation of 
·infrastructure projects by creating a special window for risk-sharing activities in line 
with .its support for small and medium-sized enterprises under the Amsterdam Special 
Action Programme of  1997. The Bank should study and develop such instruments as 
to allow it to efficiently complement financing available from commercial sources. 
'  . 
The Commission also invites the European Investment Fund, in co-ordination with its 
shareholders, to explore the possibility to provide risk capital for TENs, !illd to extend 
its activities to accession countries, together with a clarification or extension of its 
eligibility rules.  ·  ·  · 
The  Commission  finally  invites  the  Member  States  while  maintaining  budgetary 
discipline in line with the requirement of  the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact to restrUcture  at  th~ same time  government expenditure  in  favour  of 
governme~t investment. · 
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